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INDONESIA'S 1999 POLITICAL LAWS: THE RIGHT OF
ASSOCIATION IN ACEH AND PAPUA
Amber Dufsetht
Abstract: Post-Suharto Indonesia has taken steps to liberalize and codify the right
of political association through a package of political laws passed by the House of
Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat or "DPR") in 1999. International pressure
and Indonesian mass demonstrations calling for political reform provided the impetus for
the passage of the laws. Since this legal reform, the number of registered political parties
in Indonesia has jumped from three to over one hundred. Moreover, the laws provided a
legal framework for the 1999 general elections, which were widely recognized as free
and fair. The initiatives, however, have had limited effect in the outlying provinces of
Aceh and Papua, where political dissent and armed pro-independence movements are
often violently subdued by the government.
This Comment argues that the political laws' failure to protect the right of
association can be explained by a number of constraints. The speedy passage of the
political laws was driven by pressure from the International Monetary Fund and other
loan institutions. Furthermore, the Indonesian elite who drafted the laws worked to limit
political participation in order to protect their own interests. The political laws promote
elite interests by requiring that parties who participate in general elections adhere to the
principles of Pancasila democracy; in accordance with Pancasila, political parties must
be national in scope and must not endanger national unity. These requirements act as
barriers to the political aspirations of Acehnese and Papuans, who typically have strong
provincial, but not national, support and often advocate for provincial independence.
Despite the constraints in the existing laws, recent draft amendments to the political laws
do not appear to expand the right of association. This Comment suggests several
amendments to the political laws that might be made to better codify a full right of
association in Indonesia.
In the meantime, the Acehnese and Papuans' exclusion from the scope of the
political laws is enforced by the Indonesian military, which plays an active role in
suppressing Acehnese and Papuan dissent from central government policy. Ultimately,
the political laws fail to provide measures for the legitimization of separatists' grievances
in the political sphere, even if they are brought in a peaceful manner. Thus, the political
laws seem to promise nothing more than an uneasy stalemate, institutionalizing an on-
going cycle of state-sponsored violence.
1. INTRODUCTION
Indonesia's 1999 political laws represent a significant departure from
the authoritarian policies of the New Order.' During President Suharto's
2
The author would like to thank Professor Veronica Taylor for her guidance and patience and Neil
Hollister for his support during the writing process.
1 President Suharto ruled over Indonesia during the New Order regime, which lasted from 1966 to
1998. David Bourchier, Habibie's Interregnum: Reformasi, Elections, Regionalism and the Struggle for
Power, in INDONESIA IN TRANSITION: SOCIAL ASPECTS OF REFoRMASI AND CRISIS 15, 15-38 (Chris
Manning & Peter van Diermen eds., Inst. of Southeast Asian Stud., Indonesia Assessment Series, 2000).
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regime, political leaders disappeared or were imprisoned, tortured, or
executed; peaceful political dissent was violently crushed; and the rule of
3law remained subordinate to an all-powerful executive branch. As one
scholar comments, the New Order government's description of itself as
democratic "amounted to an Orwellian deception .... In fact the regime
was a complex hierarchy of authoritarian institutions designed to curtail
political participation and enable Suharto and the military to control
society. '4  In May 1998, after a severe economic downturn 5 and mass
student-led demonstrations, 6 President Suharto resigned and was replaced by
President B.J. Habibie. In the spirit of democratic reawakening, student
activists and scholars called for refornasi total ("total reform") and negara
hukum ("the rule of law").7
On January 28, 1999, the DPR endorsed four political laws: a law on
the general elections, a law on political parties, a law on the composition of
Indonesia's representative bodies, and a law concerning civil servants'
membership in political parties.8 Part I of this Comment provides a brief
description of the 1999 political laws. Part III discusses the impact of the
1999 political reform on Indonesia's political party system and the right of
association both at the center and on the periphery. This Comment argues
that the political laws do not offer a fully developed right of political
association, especially in areas where there is armed resistance to the central
government. Today, conflict rages in the outlying provinces of Aceh and
Papua, where both armed separatists and peaceful pro-independence groups
are violently suppressed by the Indonesian military (Tentara Nasional
Indonesia or 'TNT"). The political laws fail to accommodate the political
2 This Comment uses the spelling of Indonesian names according to modem Indonesian standard
orthography determined by the Indonesian Ministry of Education; thus, it uses the spelling 'Suharto' rather
than 'Soeharto,' except where the names are quoted from other materials. See INDONESIA: LAW AND
SOCIETY xiv (Timothy C. Lindsey ed., 1999).
3 For a description of Indonesia's New Order executive hegemony, see Timothy C. Lindsey,
Paradigms, Paradoxes and Possibilities: Towards Understandings of Indonesia's Legal System, in ASIAN
LAWS THROUGH AUSTRALIAN EYES 90,97-98 (Veronica Taylor ed., 1997).
4 R. William Liddle, Regime: The New Order, in INDONESIA BEYOND SUHARTO: POLITY,
ECONOMY, SOCIETY AND TRANSITION 39, 40 (Donald K. Enmerson ed., 1999).
5 ANGEL RABASA & PETER CHALK, INDONESIA'S TRANSFORMATION AND THE STABILrrY OF SOUTH
EAST ASIA 15-16 (2001); see generally Michel Camdessus, Managing Director of the Int'l Monetary Fund,
The Asian Crisis and the Int'l Response, Address at the Inst. of Advanced Bus. Stud. (IESE) of the U. of
Navarra, Barcelona, Spain (Nov. 28, 1997), Int'l Monetary Fund,
http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/speechesl1997/mds9717.htm.
6 See DAVE McRA, THE 1998 INDONESIAN STUDENT MOVEMENT (Centre of Southeast Asian Stud.,
Monash Asia Inst., Working Paper No. 110, 2001).
7 See generally KEES VAN DUK, A COUNTRY IN DESPAIR: INDONESIA BETWEEN 1997 AND 2000 161-
184 (2001) (see Chapter VII: Mounting Tension, for a description of mass demonstrations).
s Id. at 317.
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aspirations of parties advocating for independence, even when they do so
peacefully.
Part IV explores how shortcomings in the legislative process and
involvement of Indonesia's elite in drafting laws have placed significant
restraints on political reform. Part V explores where Indonesia's existing
laws fail to codify a full right of association and suggests amendments.
Finally, Part VI discusses the consequence of these shortcomings in political
reform-the institutionalization of a cycle of state-sponsored violence in
Aceh and Papua.
II. A NEW RIGHT OF POLITICAL AssocIATION?
The right of political association was first established by Indonesia's
1945 Constitution, Article 28, which guarantees that "[f]reedom of
association and assembly, of verbal and written expression and the like, shall
be prescribed by law."9  The Elucidation of the Constitution, an
accompanying document that elaborates the purpose of the Constitution,
explains that "[t]hese articles referred to here ... contain the desire of the
Indonesian people to build a state with a democratic character which seeks
to put into practice social justice and the principle of humanity." 10 Despite
the 1945 Constitution's facially democratic leanings, Indonesia's leaders
have consistently used it as a tool of repression." The ambiguous language
of the 1945 Constitution places a burden on the DPR to pass laws that codify
the right of association. Prior to 1999, the political laws in existence
severely restricted political freedoms.
12
As one of his first acts of office, President Habibie announced his
intention to draft new laws implementing the right to political association
described by Article 28, thus replacing the New Order-era political 
laws. 13
The resulting four laws are commonly referred to as the 1999 Political Laws.
Law 2/1999 Concerning Political Parties significantly opened
Indonesia's political playing field. In New Order Indonesia, only three
parties could legally exist-the United Development Party ("PPP"), the
9 INDON. CONST. (1945) art. 28, translated in MASS MEDIA LAWS AND REGULATIONS IN INDONESIA
183, 189 (Abdul Razak ed. & trans., 2000), available at http://inic.utexas.edu/asnic/
countrieslindonesia/Constlndonesia.html.
1o ELUCIDATION OF INDONESIA'S 1945 STATE CONSTITUTION art. 28, art. 29, cl. 1, art. 34, translated
in MASS MEDIA LAWS AND REGULATIONS IN INDONESIA 191,198-99 (Abdul Razak ed. & trans., 2000).
" See Marcus Mietzner, Abdurrahman's Indonesia: Political Conflict and Institutional Crisis, in
INDONESIA TODAY: CHALLENGES OF HISTORY 29 (2001).
12 Id.
13 See Habibie Outlines Reform Program, JAKARTA POST, May 26, 1998, LEXIS; see also GEOFF
SIMONS, INDONESIA: THE LONG OPPRESSION 217 (2000).
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Functional Group Party ("Golkar"),14 and the Indonesian Democratic Party
("PDI").15 The new political party law allows groups of fifty or more
Indonesian citizens to form a political party to educate citizens, influence
policy, and participate in general elections. 16  While every political party
must comply with the "five principles" of Pancasila democracy, 17 Pancasila
need not be the sole ideological basis of the parties.18 Parties may advocate
any platform that does not contradict these principles.' 9  Importantly,
political parties must not, in the government's view, "endanger national
unity." 20 For the first time in over thirty years, Indonesians have been able
to form parties organized based on a religious or ethnic affiliation, although
21parties must open membership to all Indonesian citizens. Parties with
22
communist affiliations remain banned. Parties that do not comply with the
requirements of the political laws may be "dissolved" by the government.2 3
Law 3/1999 Concerning General Elections was passed in anticipation
of Indonesia's first free and fair elections in over forty years. 2 4 During the
14 Golkar was referred to as a "functional group" during the New Order and was not officially
declared a political party until after the end of the New Order. VAN DUK, supra note 7, at 536.
15 This three party structure was established by Law 3/1975, which was replaced by Law 2/1999.
See Spencer Zifcak, 'But a Shadow of Justice' Political Trials in Indonesia, in INDONESIA: LAW AND
SOCIETY, supra note 2, at 357 (discussing application of political laws in the New Order era).16 Law Concerning Political Parties No. 2 art. 2, § 1 (Rep. of Indon., Dept. of Info., trans., 1999).
"? IL art. 2, § 2 (a)-(b). The Law Concerning Political Parties requires parties to "[i]nclude Pancasila
as basis and ideology of the Unitary State of the Republic of the State of the Republic of Indonesia in the
Party Statutes." Id. The five principles are listed in the preamble to 1945 Constitution of the Republic of
Indonesia, as follows:
1. Belief in the One Supreme God;
2. Just and Civilized Humanity;
3. Unity of Indonesia;
4. 'Deliberative' Democracy; and
5. Social Justice.
INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, INDONESIA AND THE RULE OF LAW 36 (1987). For a discussion
of the overriding importance of the precepts of Pancasila in Indonesian society, see E. DARMAPUTERA,
PANCASILA AND THE SEARCH FOR IDENTrY AND MODERNITY IN INDONESIAN SOCIETY: A CULTURAL AND
ETHICAL ANALYSIS (1988).
18 In contrast, the political laws passed in 1985 and repealed by the laws of 1999 required that
"political parties and social organizations had to declare that the Pancasila was their asas tunggal, their
sole base[.]" VAN DUK, supra note 7, at 31.
19 Law Concerning Political Parties No. 2, art. 5, § 1 (Rep. of Indon., Dept. of Info., trans., 1999).
to Id. art. 3.
21 Id. art. 3, art. 2, § 2 (c).
22 Id. art. 16, § (a). President Suharto gained power in 1966 following a brutal massacre of hundreds
of thousands of members of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and their suspected associates.
Geonawaa Mohamad, Remembering the Left, supra note 11, at 126. The Law Concerning Political Parties'
aversion to communism is nothing new: the Suharto regime "created a fear of anything 'leftist' and
threatened anyone fostering opinions tainted with Marxism." Id.
2 Law Concerning Political Parties No. 2, art. 17, § 2 (Rep. of Indon., Dept. of Info., trans., 1999).
24 The last Indonesian elections recognized by the international community as free and fair were held
in 1955. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, supra note 17, at 45.
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New Order, only three political parties2 5 were able to compete in general
elections and Golkar, President Suharto's Functional Group, inevitably
won.26  Thus, elections prior to 1999 were "not intended to establish a
democratic government, but rather only to legitimize the existing power
system. '2 7  In contrast, the General Elections law sought to enable
Indonesians a true choice in government by ensuring a "democratic,
transparent, fair and just general election by direct, general and secret
,,28
voting.
The General Elections law establishes electoral districts, defines the
number of seats in the DPR and the Regional House of Representatives
("DPRD"), and provides a general framework for party campaigning,
administering, and supervising general elections. 29 Additionally, the law
designates who has the right to vote and establishes qualifications for
political parties that wish to participate in general elections and candidates
who wish to compete in them.30 Parties are required to have offices in more
than one-half of Indonesia's fourteen provinces in order to compete in
general elections. 31 In addition, they must have headquarters in more than
one-half of the number of districts/regencies in those provinces.3 2 The law
requires that parties win at least 2% of the number of DPR seats or 3% of the
number of the seats in the DPRD, to be eligible to participate in the next
General Election.33  Pursuant to the General Elections law, forty-eight
parties registered and competed in the June 7, 1999 general elections;
twenty-one of the contesting parties won seats in the DPR;34 and six of these
parties were able to win at least 2% of the seats in the DPR or 3% of the
seats in the DPRD and thus qualify to compete in the next general
elections.
35
7' Law on Political Parties and the Functional Group No.3 (1975) (Indon.), amended by Transitional
Law Concerning Political Parties and Functional Groups No. 3 (1985) (Indon.).
26 REFORM IN INDONESIA: VISION AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF PRESIDENT B.J. HABIBIE: VOLUME 1
ECONOMIC & POLITCAL REFORMS 94 (Ahmad Watik Pratiknya eds. et al., 1999).
27 Id.
28 Law Concerning General Elections No. 3, preamble (Rep. of Indon., Dept. of Info., trans., 1999).
29 Id. ch. II (Electoral District and Number of Seats), ch. III (Implementation and Organization), ch.
VI (Supervision and Control of General Elections), ch. IX (Election Campaigns), and ch. X (Voting and
Counting Votes).
'o Id. ch. V (The Right to Vote), ch. VI (Registration of Voters), ch. Vn (Requirements of
Participation in General Elections), and ch. VIII (The Right To Be Elected and Candidacy).
3 Id. ch. VII, art. 39, § 1 (b) (Requirements of Participation in General Elections).
32 Id. ch. VII, art. 39, § 1 (c).
33 Id. ch. VII, art. 39, § 3.
34 Greg Fealy, Parties and Parliament: Serving Whose Interests?, in INDONESIA TODAY:
CHALLENGES OF HISTORY, supra note 11, at 100.
35 Law Concerning General Elections No. 3, art. 39, § 3 (Rep. of Indon., Dept. of Info., trans., 1999);
see also Mietzner, supra note 11, at 39.
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Law 4/1999 Concerning the Composition of the MPR, DPR and
DPRD was passed to reform the composition and structure of the People's
Consultative Assembly ("MPR"), the House of Representatives ("DPR"),
and the Regional House of Representatives ("DPRD").36 The law reduces
the representation of Indonesia's military37 from a quota of seventy-five
seats in the DPR and MPR38 to only thirty-eight seats. 39 Drafters hoped that
this reduction in military representation would reduce the political influence
of the military, and degrade its dwi fungsi, or dual social and security
function.40
Finally, Law 5/1999 Concerning Civil Servant Membership in
Political Parties prohibits civil servants from becoming members of political
parties without taking paid leave from their jobs. 41 The law allows civil
servants to vote in elections.42 This law was passed in an attempt to
extricate political parties from Indonesia's government bureaucracy, and
thus sever the tight grasp of Golkar, the leading party of the New Order, on
government institutions.43 During the New Order, civil servants were
required by the Indonesia Civil Servants Corps to support Golkar, and the
party received significant monetary contributions from the Corps.44 The law
specifies that "Civil Servants must adopt a [politically] neutral attitude and
refrain from using state facilities for a certain group 45 and must "not
36 Law Concerning The Composition and Status of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), The
House of Representatives (DPR), and The Regional House of Representatives (DPRD) No. 4 (Rep. of
Indon., Dept. of Info., trans., 1999).
3 Id. art. 11, § 3 (b). During the New Order era, Indonesia's security forces, including both military
and police forces, were called the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia (Angkatan Bersenjata
Republik Indonesia or "ABRI"). Atmadji Sumarkidjo, The Rise and Fall of the Generals: The Indonesian
Military at a Crossroads, in INDONESIA TODAY: CHALLENGES OF HISTORY, supra note 11, at 143. In
September 1999, while Indonesia's military was undergoing internal restructuring, including the separation
of the police force, its name was changed from ABRI to TNI. Id.3 Arief Budiman, The 1998 Crisis: Change and Continuity in Indonesia, in REFORMASI: CRISIS AND
CHANGE IN INDONESIA 41, 52 (Arief Budiman eds. et al., 1999). Prior to 1997 the military's representation
in the MPR was 150 seats. Id.
39 Bourchier, supra note 1, at 18.
40 Peter Holland, Regional Government and Central Authority, in INDONESIA: LAW & SOCIETY,
supra note 2, at 212.
41 Law Concerning Civil Servant Membership in Political Parties No. 5, art. 5 (Rep. of Indon., Dept.
of Info., trans., 1999) ('Civil Servants who have become a member and/or board member of a political
party must abide with the stipulation mentioned in this Government Regulation."). Article 8, section 1
stipulates that Civil Servants who are party members "shall be dismissed from their state function and shall
be given interim compensation money[.I" Id. art. 8, § 1.
42 Id. art. 5.
43 This attempt to remove bias and corruption from government institutions is often referred to as the
attempt to free Indonesia from "KKN"---collusion, corruption and nepotism. VAN DUK, supra note 7, at
114.
44 REFORM IN INDONESIA, supra note 26, at 114.
45 Law Concerning Civil Servant Membership in Political Parties No. 5, art. 3 (Rep. of Indon., Dept.
of Info., trans., 1999).
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discriminate. ' ' 6 The passage of the law was hotly contested by Golkar in
the DPR, but passed after intense negotiations.47
III. THE IMPACr OF TiE 1999 POLrrIcAL REFORMS
The passage of Law 2/1999 Concerning Political Parties, Law 3/1999
Concerning General Elections, Law 4/1999 Concerning the Composition of
the MPR, DPR and DPRD, and Law 5/1999 Concerning Political Party
Membership of Civil Servants created an impressive laundry list of
legislation aimed at institutionalizing political openness and the right of
association. However, today, the Indonesian political system remains in
crisis. Awash in law, Indonesia remains short on reform. As a Jakarta Post
editorial describes,
With all these new legal instruments instituted as part of the
national reforms--both [Wahid] and Megawati were elected
[President] on reformist platforms-you would have thought
Indonesia would be well on its way to becoming a civil,
peaceful and prosperous nation. Wrong. Indonesia in 2001 is
as messy, if not even messier, than it has ever been in the last
three years, in spite of, or some would say because of, these
measures in the legal sector.48
As the editorial reflects, the DPR has crafted piles of legislation. Law alone,
however, has been unable to solve the inherent tensions between Indonesia's
central government and peripheral provinces. Since the passage of the
political laws, the number of registered political parties has jumped from
three to over one hundred, and the country held its first general elections,
which were widely recognized in the international community as free and
fair.49 Yet, the political laws are imperfect and do not offer a fully
developed right of political association for provincial activists who advocate
for independence. The political parties that were most adept at forming
Id. art. 4.
17 Deal Struck on Civil Servants, JAKARTA POST, Jan. 27, 1999, LEXIS; Golkar's Acquiescence,
JAKARTA POST, Jan. 25, 1999, LEXIS.
4 Reform Starts with the Men Behind the Law, JAKARTA POST, Dec. 31, 2001, LEXIS.
49 MUHAMMAD A.S. HIKAM, PROBLEMS OF POLITICAL TRANSmON IN POST NEW ORDER INDONESIA
3 (Willem van der Geest & Paul Lim eds., Eur. Inst. for Asian Stud., Briefing Paper No. 99/01, 1999); see
generally UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, TRANSITION To DEMOCRACY: REPORT ON THE
UNDP TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMME FOR THE 1999 INDONESIAN GENERAL ELECTIONS (Merril
Stevensen & Anne-Birgitte Albrectsen eds., 1999).
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under Law 2/1999, registering for elections under Law 3/1999, and
mobilizing voters in the 1999 elections--Golkar, the PDI (Indonesian
Democratic Party), and the PKB (National Awakening Party) 50-had a
strong base at the center of Indonesia, not at the periphery.51 While close to
Jakarta, several political demonstrations have been held in relative peace. In
Aceh and Papua the government has routinely employed military force to
suppress both peaceful political demonstrations and armed separatism.
52
A. Aceh's Islamic Separatist Movement
The province of Aceh lies on the northern tip of the island of Sumatra
in Indonesia, over one thousand miles northwest of the Indonesian capitol of
Jakarta. In 1959, Suharto's regime granted Aceh a special region status that
gave the Acehnese autonomy over religion, local Islamic law, and custom.
53
However, in 1969, the regime effectively ended the era of special region
status,54 bringing the ulamas (Islamic religious leaders) and the All-Aceh
Ulama Association ("PUSA") under the control of the state; thus, the ulamas
were deprived of their traditional roles as Aceh's political and religious
leaders. 55 Acehnese saw Jakarta's centralized rule as corrupt, neglectful, and
un-Islamic.
56
Gerakan Aceh Merdeka ("GAM" or "Free Aceh"), a group of hard-
line separatists, was formed in 1976 with the goal of creating an independent
Islamic state, partly in response to the state's repressive action.57 GAM has
harnessed an "underlying sense of dissatisfaction," and used it to "justify a
50 Jared Levinson, Indonesia's Odyssey: A Nation's Long, Perilous Journey to the Rule of Law and
Democracy, 18 ARIZ. J. INT'L& COMP. L. 103, 107-08 (2001).
51 RABASA & CHALK, supra note 5, at 10-11.
52 See, e.g., From Chaos to Despair: After a Week of Drama that Left the President Increasingly
Isolated, Indonesia Faces the Prospect of Violence in the Streets, Political Paralysis and Economic Ruin,
FAR E. ECON. REv., Feb. 15, 2001, 2001 WL-FEER 6645704 (noting "demonstrations [calling for the
removal of President Wahid] so far have been orderly and peaceful, certainly different from the 1998
upheaval that removed Suharto"); Protests At Wahid Palace In Indonesia; Fincl Mkts Plunge, DOW JONES
INT'L NEWS, Mar. 12, 2001, WESTLAW; but see, e.g., Indonesian Police Fire Teargas at Student Protest
Near Suharto Home, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, May 25, 2000, 2000 WL 2801074. Participants in several
demonstrations were killed or injured by security forces seeking to disperse pro-independence crowds or
suppress separatists in both Aceh and Papua. See UNrTD STATES DEPT. OF STATE, INDONESIA COUNTRY
REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACICES FOR 2000 § 2(b) (2002), U.S. Dept. of State,
http:lwww.state.govlgldrllrlslhrrpt2000/eap/index.cfmn?docid=707.
53 MiEKE KooISTRA, INDONESIA: REGIONAL CONFLICTS AND STATE TERROR 15 (Minority Rights
Grou Int'l 2001).
The special region status was not officially terminated until 1989. See generally RABASA &
CHALK, supra note 5.
55 KOOcSTRA, supra note 53, at 15.
56 RABASA & CHALK, supra note 5, at 27-28.
57 11 at 29.
VOL. 11 No. 3
THE RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION IN INDONESIA
general call to arms." 58 After an escalation in violence, Aceh was designated
an Operational Military Zone (Dareah Operasi Milite or "DOM") in 1990
by Suharto; the designation gave the military a virtual free hand to crush
GAM rebels by whatever means necessary. 59 Within the first two years of
the Operational Military Zone's existence, approximately 2000 unarmed
civilians were killed by the military.6° The government's approach stymied
immediate separatist activity but, over time, fueled growing radicalization
61
and anger.
By the late 1990s, a civil society-based movement began to advocate
for provincial independence.62 In February 1999, after President Habibie
announced his intention to allow a referendum in East Timor on
independence, the student-led Information Center for a Referendum on Aceh
("SIRA") formed and argued that the central government should hold a
provincial referendum on independence to resolve the Aceh conflict.63
Throughout 1999, the nascent pro-independence political movement was
fueled by a frustrated, highly mobilized population and quickly gathered
steam.64  On November 8, 1999, after Wahid came into office, an
independence rally in Aceh's provincial capital of Banda drew a crowd of up
to one million people-the largest single public demonstration of separatist
sentiment in Indonesian history.65 The rally was largely peaceful despite the
66fact that participants demanded a referendum on independence.
On December 4, 1999, Acehnese celebrated a self-proclaimed
"Independence Day" both in the urban centers and countryside without
interference. 67 One Indonesian scholar referred to the rallies as "velvet
protests," drawing parallels to Czechoslovakia's bloodless Velvet
Revolution. 68 While the SIRA-led protests were generally peaceful, this
analogy is imperfect from a broader perspective---GAM's independence
" i. at 27-29.
5' HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, VOL. 13, NO. 4(C), THE WAR IN ACEH 8 (2001) [hereinafter WAR IN
ACEH]. The DOM was created in response to GAM's escalation of violence in 1989-90. KOOISTRA, supra
note 53, at 16; and RABASA & CHALK, supra note 5, at 30.
6o KooiSTRA, supra note 53, at 16. The DOM was lifted in August 1998. ANTHONY L. SMITH,
INDONESIA: ONE STATE, MANY STATES, CHAOTIC STATES? 16 (ISEAS Working Papers, Int'l Pol. and
Security Issues No. 1, 2001).
61 RABASA & CHALK, supra note 5, at 33.
62 id.
63 WAR IN ACEH, supra note 59, at 9.
6 id.
65 RABASA & CHALK, supra note 5, at 35.
6 Aboeprijadi Santoso, Violence in the Age of Reformasi-An Introduction, Address at the Univ. of
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efforts often have been exceedingly bloody. Wahid initially attempted to
pacify the Acehnese, who demanded redress for gross human rights
violations committed by the military, through presidential decree No.
88/1999, which established an Independent Commission to Investigate
Violence in Aceh.69 Despite Wahid's tolerance of the rallies and the
creation of the commission, violent clashes between pro-independence GAM
and military forces soon resumed.70
A year later, in November 2000, Indonesian security forces violently
suppressed a mass rally organized by the SIRA in Banda. 71 The military
blocked Acehnese from reaching the 2000 Banda rally by shooting at sea
and land transport, arresting and beating members of the organizing
committee and raiding offices of NGOs before the rally.72  The
organizational leader of the rally was arrested and charged with "spreading
hatred" against the government under Article 154 of the Indonesian Criminal
Code.73
On May 15, 2000, President Wahid and GAM signed a temporary
three-month cease-fire, the Joint Agreement on Humanitarian Pause. As
part of the negotiations, Jakarta withdrew combat elements of the TNI and
turned over internal security functions in the province to the police, with the
military providing backup as necessary. 75 While the peace talks were a
76landmark, they were quickly overtaken by renewed fighting. On April 1,
2001, President Wahid issued Presidential Instruction (Inpres) No. 4, which
declared that the GAM negotiations were ineffective, and set up a cabinet to
restructure the security apparatus in Aceh.77 The restructured troops
embarked on "a systematic effort to target suspected GAM strongholds and
headquarters, with many claims by local organizations of civilians killed in
the process. 78  In June 2001, the Indonesian government proposed a
regional autonomy package that would allow Aceh to retain 70% of
provincial revenues and institute elements of Islamic law starting January 1,
69 KOOISTRA, supra note 53, at 17.
70 During 2000, several prominent Aceh human rights defenders and Acehnese activists disappeared
and were later found tortured and killed or not found at all. WAR IN ACEH, supra note 59, at 17.
71 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2002: INDONESIA, http://www.hrw.org/wr2k2Jasia7.htmnl
[hereinafter WORLD REPORT 2002].
7 id.
73 id.
74 WAR IN ACEH, supra note 59.
75 id.
76 Santoso, supra note 66.
77 WAR IN ACEH, supra note 59, at 11.
78 j,
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2002.79  This special autonomy law did little to quell unrest within the
province and fighting continued. In July 2001, after President Megawati
took office, six GAM emissaries to the dialogue process were arrested and
jailed by police, in clear violation of the negotiation protocol.80 With this
kidnapping, the Indonesian government demonstrated its unwillingness to
engage in peaceful dialogue with those it sees as a threat to national unity.
One scholar comments that the lack of "negotiations in good faith on the part
of the Indonesian government" is a major obstacle to establishing a
meaningful dialogue with pro-independence activists.
81
President Megawati, like her predecessors, has a strong interest in
ensuring the unity of Indonesia. 82  In part, the central government is
concerned that once periphery secedes, the center may crumble.
83
Moreover, the government wants to maintain some control over Aceh's rich
natural resources-Aceh produces over 30% of Indonesia's gas exports.8
4
The organized, relatively well-equipped, 85 foreign-funded 86 GAM forces
present a clear threat to these goals.
In the process of neutralizing the threat of GAM, however, the
executive has often conflated GAM with other peaceful civil society-based
movements such as SIRA. As one NGO comments, while in Aceh
"disaffection with the central government" showed itself both in the form of
"a strong civil society-based movement for a referendum on Aceh's political
status and in an armed rebel group[,] ... Indonesian security forces made
little distinction between the two." 7 The Indonesian government has failed
to grasp that GAM and SIRA have different political goals and employ
vastly different means to achieve them; ultimately, SIRA's "commitment to
peaceful means for achieving its political ends . . . remains at odds with
GAM's commitment to armed struggle." 88  By responding to peaceful
79 Roberto Belloni, Aceh Self-Determination Conflict Profile, FOREIGN POLICY IN FOCus,
http://www.selfdetermine.org/conflicts/acehbody.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2002).
go Id.; see also WORLD REPORT 200"2, supra note 71.
8' E-mail from Gary F. Bell, Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Nat'l Univ. of Sing., to author
(Mar. 8, 2002) (on file with author).
82 Megawati Says Indonesia Faces Break-Up, INDON. OBSERVER ON THE WEB, Mar. 4, 2002,
http://www.indonesian-observer.com/includelisiall.php?ED=318.
83 Interview with Professor Veronica Taylor, Director of Asian Law Center, Univ. of Wash. Sch. of
Law in Seattle, Wash. (May 1, 2002) (notes on file with author).
4 SMrrH, supra note 60, at 15.
85 WAR IN ACEI-, supra note 59, at 5. (GAM is "an increasingly well-organized and motivated force
of perhaps 10,000 regulars, less than 2,000 of whom may be armed.").
86 RABASA & CHALK, supra note 5, at 32.
87 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH: WORLD REPORT 2001: INDONESIA, http://www.hrw.org/wr2kl/asia/
indonesia.html [hereinafter WORLD REPORT 2001].
88 WAR IN ACEH, supra note 59, at 19.
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political association such as the December 1999 and November 2000 rallies
with military force, the government has essentially undermined the political
laws and converted them into the vehicles of state-sponsored violence.
B. Papuan (Irian Jayan) Flag Raisings
Papua, a province "roughly the size of France, has a population under
two million in a country of over two hundred million, and its capital,
Jayapura, is some 3500 kilometers (2100 miles) from the Indonesian capital
[of] Jakarta.' 89 Papua 9° was transferred to Indonesia by the United Nations
in 1963 with the proviso that an "Act of Free Choice" be held in 1968 to
determine whether the inhabitants desired to be a part of Indonesia. 91 To
fulfill this requirement, the Indonesian government hand-selected 1022 tribal
leaders who met in August 1969 and confirmed integration with Indonesia
without a formal vote.92 Soon after the closely orchestrated vote, the Free
Papua Movement (Organisasi Papua Merdeka or "OPM") formed with a
core of 200 fighters and began a low-intensity insurgency. 93 Papua was
declared an Operational Military Zone (Dareah Operasi Milite or "DOM")
in 1969 in order to combat the OPM.94 However, the OPM has "never
coalesced into the united or organized form its name implies." 95 This armed
separatist movement has been accompanied by a civilian movement,
including the Forum for the Reconciliation of the Irian Jaya Society
("FORERI") and the Papua Presidium Council, that "has repeatedly
expressed its commitment to pursuing its oals [of a national referendum for
independence] through peaceful means.
The post-Suharto government has been unable to reconcile the
Papuans' desire for independence with its vision of a unified Indonesia.
When President Habibie met with a delegation of 100 provincial
representatives ('Team of 100") in February 1999 to launch a "National
Dialogue" regarding Papuan autonomy, the delegation declared its desire for
89 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, VOL 12, NO. 2(C), HUMAN RIGHTS AND PRO-INDEPENDENCE ACTIONS
IN PAPUA, 1999-2000 2 (2000) [hereinafter PRO-INDEPENDENCE ACTIONS IN PAPUA].
90 Historically, Papua has been referred to as Irian Jaya and West Papua. For the sake of simplicity,
this Comment refers to the province as Papua.
91 SIMONS, supra note 13, at 93.
92 RABASA & CHALK, supra note 5, at 38; Danilyn Rutherford, Waiting for the End in Biak:
Violence, Order, and a Flag Raising, in VIOLENCE AND THE STATE IN SUHARTO'S INDONESIA 189, 191
(Benedict R. O'G. Anderson ed., Cornell Southeast Asia Program, 2001).
93 PRO-INDEPENDENCE ACTIONS IN PAPUA, supra note 89, at 6.
94 Id. The DOM was not lifted until October 1998, and was the longest in Indonesia's history. Id.
95 Id.
9 Id. at 9-10.
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independence.97 After this clear call for independence, Habibie reverted to
the practices of his predecessor, "attempting to round up independence
supporters and censor discussion on the subject. 9 8 Jakarta's response to the
call for independence was to ban all discussion or dissemination of
information on independence or autonomy.99 On April 17, 1999 Papua's
police chief issued an Order banning all mention of the National Dialogue
meeting.100 Human Rights Watch decried the Order as calling for "systemic




After President Wahid was elected in October 1999, he acknowledged
the Indonesian government's human rights violations and "moved quickly to
allow greater freedom and to permit the open expression of pro-
independence views."'1 2 Initially Wahid permitted peaceful raisings of the
Papuan "Morning Star" independence flag. 10 3 On December 1, 1999, the
Dutch-created Papuan Independence Day, the raisings were held without
police interference in at least a dozen locations within Papua.'0 4 Yet, on
December 2, 1999, when demonstrators in Timika, on Papua's south coast,
refused to take down a Papuan flag flying in a church courtyard the day after
the ceremonies, security forces fired into an angry crowd, wounding
sixteen. 1° 5 There were similar instances of violence at flag raisings in
Genyem and Sorong.1
06
In May 2000, Wahid funded a Papuan congress, called the Great
Consultation, to address the regional autonomy issue. 1°7 Several hundred
representatives from 254 indigenous tribes met in the provincial capital,
Jayapura, and concluded that the annexation process was illegal and that the
territory was legally independent. The representatives then raised a Morning
Star flag to symbolize their stand. 0 8 Wahid was unwilling to meet the
Congress' demands. Instead he publicly declared that the Indonesian
97 Rutherford, supra note 92, at 193.
98 PRO-INDEPENDENCE ACTIONS IN PAPUA, supra note 89, at 3.
99 Id. at 17.100 Id at 16-17. The Order No. POL: MK/Oi/IV/1999 banned all "activities related to the discussion
and dissemination of the results of the meeting with president B.J. Habibie with delegates of Irian Jaya[,]"
"the formation of the National Committee of West Papuan Youth ... and similar organizations in the Irian
Jaya police district[,I" the building of communications posts (pos komunikasi) used as meeting posts, and
the formation of neighborhood patrols. Id.
101 Id.
"o Id. at 3.
103 Id. at 3, 5.
104 id.
105 WORLD REPORT 2001, supra note 87.
106 id.
107 Mietzner, supra note 11, at 34; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, VOL 13, No. 2(C), VIOLENCE AND
POLITICAL IMPASSE IN PAPUA 10 (2001) [hereinafter POLmCAL IMPASSE IN PAPUA].
108 RABASA & CHALK, supra note 5, at 38.
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government did "not recognize the congress," and that it was "illegitimate"
because it did not evenly represent all sectors of Papuan society. 1 9 Despite
the fact that the Papuan Congress was encouraged by the central
government, three members of the Papua Presidium Council were charged
with subversion for their leadership at the Congress; the leaders were later
acquitted."10
As a stopgap measure, Wahid announced that the Papuan
independence flag could be flown until the annual session of the DPR. 1 '
When this period expired in October 2000, the police attempted to take the
flags down, leading to bloody clashes between demonstrators and police.
12
In at least six instances during 2000, police broke up peaceful
demonstrations in which Papuans raised the Papuan independence flag and,
after demonstrators resisted, killed, and injured many demonstrators. 113
Police also broke up several peaceful demonstrations. 14 Wahid suggested
that Irian Jaya should be renamed Papua in deference to local sentiment-
this proposal was accepted in 2001 as part of a special autonomy law." 5 On
October 26, 2000, President Wahid declared that because the Morning Star
flag was a separatist symbol, Papuans would need to find "another cultural
symbol."1 6 After Wahid's announcement, the military engaged in "periodic
and often violent raids... on gatherings where independence symbols are
on display.
' 1
In June 2001, the Indonesian government proposed a regional
autonomy package that would allow Papua to retain 70% of provincial
revenues starting January 1, 2002; this autonomy bill was passed by the
DPR on October 23, 2001.1' While this law is an important gesture, it has
failed to address the region's human rights issues.
1 19
On November 10, 2001, Theys Eluay, the chair of the Papua
Presidium Council, was abducted on his way home from a ceremony
109 POLITICAL IMPASSE IN PAPUA, supra note 107, at 11.
110 Eriko Uchida, Indonesian District Court Clears Papuan Leaders of All Charges, GEOCITIES, Mar.
7, 2002, http://www.geocities.comlaroki.geo/0204/INA-papuanleadersdeclared.html. The three Papuan
Presidium Council leaders were acquitted on March 4, 2002 by the Jayapura District Court. Id. The Judge
held that the three "could not be sentenced to imprisonment because they had organized the congress with
the full knowledge and support of the local and central governments." Id.
"MIETZNER, supra note 11, at 34.
112 Id.
113 UNrrED STATES DEPT. OF STATE, supra note 52.
114 Id.
... POLrICAL IMPASSE IN PAPUA, supra note 107, at 11; Uchida, supra note 110.
116 POLITICAL IMPASSE IN PAPUA, supra note 107, at 22.
117 Id.
118 Belloni, supra note 79; WORLD REPORT 2002, supra note 71.
119 Belloni, supra note 79.
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marking Heroes Day at the local headquarters of Kopassus (the Indonesian
army's Special Forces) and later found dead. 120 Under President Megawati's
direction the National Investigation Commission ("KPN") completed an
investigation of the murder. 121 Recently the Papua Presidium Council has
taken its case to the United Nations ("UN"), presenting a petition to the UN
Secretary-General Kofi Annan, asking the UN to acknowledge its negative
role in accepting the discredited Act of Free Choice.122 The Council is also
in the process of preparing an international law case against the UN and the
countries involved in the Act of Free Choice.
123
Since the passage of the political laws, the Indonesian central
government has vacillated between encouraging political association in
Papua and employing military force to dismantle pro-independence groups.
President Megawati is deeply concerned that the violence in Aceh and Papua
could lead to the break-up of Indonesia and, since taking office in July 23,
has "steadfastly insisted on national unity and quickly ordered the military to
crack down on secessionist groups."' 24 While OPM's small low-intensity
insurgency poses less of a threat to the central government than GAM, its
claims for independence, based on the questionable Act of Free Choice, are
generally accepted as more legitimate than Aceh's. The very legitimacy of
Papua's independence movement is what makes it threatening to the central
government.
The civil society-based pro-independence movement, including
FORERI and the Papuan Presidium Council, has consistently advocated its
pro-independence referendum platform in a peaceful manner; however, the
movement has been denied access to the political system created by the
political laws. The central government has labeled FORERI and the Papuan
Presidium Council as subversive and a danger to national unity, thus
alienating them from the scope of the laws.125  Because the central
government refuses to legitimize the political aspirations of Papuan pro-
independence activists through the political laws, the only remaining method
of dialogue is state-sponsored violence and suppression.
120 Human Rights Watch, Indonesia: Investigate Death of Papuan Leader, HUMAN RiGmS NEWS,
Nov. 11, 2001, http://www.hrw.orglpress/2001/1 1/indonesial 11 1.htm.
121 Dead Papua Leader's Group Take on the UN, INDON. OBSERVER ON THE WEB, Mar. 22, 2002,
http://www.indonesian-observer.com/includetisi-aU.php?ID=-395.
12 Id.
I2 Id.; see supra Part I1I.B (describing Act of Free Choice).
:24 Megawati Says Indonesia Faces Break-Up, supra note 82.
125 See Law Concerning Political Parties No. 2, art. 3 (Rep. of Indon., Dept. of Info., trans., 1999)
("The formation of Political Parties may not endanger the national unity and integrity."); see infra Part VI.
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IV. CONSTRAINTS IN THE PROCESS OF DRAFTING THE POLITICAL LAWS
An examination of the cases of Aceh and Papua demonstrates that the
political laws have been ineffective at providing an instrument for the
legitimization of political grievances. The failure of these laws to protect the
right of association at the periphery can be attributed to several factors.
First, the political laws were passed quickly to satisfy international donor
organizations. Moreover, the Suharto-era elite involved in the drafting
process was keen to protect its own interests. After decades of authoritarian
rule, the right of association that has emerged from Indonesia's 1999
political laws is both exceedingly fragile and reflective of the elite's distrust
of political pluralism. Unsurprisingly, the political laws are a combination
of old and new. While the laws do liberalize the right of association, they
are also a reflection of the Pancasila-based ideals and the lopsided center-
periphery balance of the New Order.
A. International Loan Organization Intervention
The shortcomings of the political laws are partially due to the
perfunctory nature of the 1999 legislative reforms, which were driven by
Indonesia's dire need for International Monetary Fund ("IMF") and World
Bank loans. When the political laws were passed, Indonesia was in the
depth of an economic crisis; the government was desperate to satisfy various
multilateral organizations and qualify for successive loan disbursements. 26
Indonesia's substantive legal reform has been characterized as the
International Monetary Fund ("IMF"), the World Bank, and other loan
institutions "placing ticks . . . on the reformasi hukum ["legal reform"]
shopping list."' 27 While the 1999 political reform was not an explicit loan
condition, political reform was, in effect, an implicit precursor of receiving
continued aid. The IMF had made it clear that "good governance" was a
necessary antecedent to economic stability, and this included "encouraging
the rule of law, improving the efficiency and accountability of the public
sector, and tackling corruption." 128
126 SIMONS, supra note 13, at 216-17.127 Timothy C. Lindsey, "Corruption" as Rational Response in the Aspal State: The Failure of
Reformasi Hukum, in INDONESIA AFrER SOEHARTO: REFORMASI AND REACTION INTERNATIONAL
COLLOQUIUM PROCEEDINGS MARCH 19, 1999 176, 176 (Drew Duncan & Timothy C. Lindsey eds., 1999).128 Michel Camdessus, Managing Director of the Int'l Monetary Fund, The IMF and Good
Governance, Address Before Transparency Int'l in France (Jan. 21, 1998), Int'l Monetary Fund,
https://www.imf.orglextemal/np/speeches/1998/012198.htm. In February 1999, a World Bank and IMF
report was leaked by AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE which was very self-critical of their New Order economic
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Moreover, Indonesia's social unrest was seen as a serious barrier to
economic reform. Analyst Pande Raja Silalahi from the Center for Strategic
and International Studies (CSIS) reported that "international agencies have
warned that political conditions would determine their decisions on loan
assistance for the country.' 29 Silalahi explained, "[s]uccess in the economic
program is impossible under the prevailing situation with conflicts
continuing between the political leaders and riotin[g] and communal clashes
hampering all economic programs." 130  Michal Camdessus, the former
managing director of IMF, explained countries' hesitance to make
contributions to the Indonesian economy:
Understandably, market participants are waiting to see if, this
time, there will be concrete evidence of policy reform. But
there are some good reasons to expect that the program will be
carried out. To begin with, the Indonesian officials with whom
IMF staff have [sic] been working have made a serious effort to
address the country's fundamental problems, while seeking
ways to mitigate the increased social costs of adjustment.'
31
When President Habibie came into office in May 1998, the IMF had frozen
the next disbursement in Indonesia's $40 billion rescue package, pending a
review by the IMF Asia director. 32 Habibie was under severe pressure to
show that he was a credible figure committed to reform and to convince the
IMF that the money would be put to good use. 133 On May 25, 1998, Habibie
used his first cabinet meeting to announce his intention to support the
passage of new political laws liberalizing Indonesia's restrictive election
development efforts in Indonesia: the report opined that "[w]hile the [Indonesian] government's
development strategy has had remarkably positive results, issues of poor governance, social stress and a
weak financial sector were not addressed and contributed to the depth of the crisis[.]" Paul Blustein, World
Bank Cites Own Failures in Indonesia: Internal Critique Says Officials Overlooked Signs of Impending
Financial Crisis, WASH. POST A10, Feb. 23, 1999, 1999 WL 7402385. Weary of repeating the same
mistakes, the IMF and World Bank were more willing to address problem of poor governance once Habibie
took power.
129 Doubts Arise Over Indonesia Govt's Ability to Secure Loans, ASIA PULSE, Jan. 28, 1999, 1999
WL 5082406.
130 Id.
131 Michel Camdessus, Managing Director of the Int'l Monetary Fund, Australia and Asia in the
Global Economy, Address at the "Australia Unlimited" Round Table in Melbourne, Australia (May 5,
1998), Int'l Monetary Fund, http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/1998/ 050598.htm.
132 SMONS, supra note 13, at 216-17.
133 Id. at 216. Author Simons comments that as of May 1998 the IMF was "hesitant about supplying
additional loans to buttress the ruined economy. It was now plain that Habibie would not have long to
demonstrate that he had the political skills to overcome the protracted crisis." Id.
JUNE 2002
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
laws and allowing every Indonesian the right to form a political party.
1 3 4
Despite this lip service to reform, critics were weary of delays and searching
for signs of change. Indonesia signed a Letter of Intent with the IMF on
June 24, 1998, which recited that "[t]he revised economic program . . .
despite a promising start, has been driven well off track by the social
disturbances and political change that occurred in May.""13  The Letter
acknowledged that "[a]s a result of the social and political upheavals in May,
the economic situation and outlook have worsened considerably, and the
economy faces a very serious crisis. The distribution network has been
badly damaged, economic activity, including exports, generally disrupted,
and business confidence severely shaken."' 36 The government needed to
reign in the mayhem in order to regain the confidence of loan institutions.
In response to this strong international pressure, Indonesia's political
laws were hastily drafted. Various Indonesian NGO's and government
entities presented proposals for new political laws, but the proposals were
only available for public review and comment between August and
December 1998.137 After receiving limited public input, a seven-member
team from the Department of the Interior drafted the political laws and
submitted them to the DPR and MPR. On January 28, 1999, the DPR
endorsed four new political laws: the political party law, the general election
law, the law on the composition of the representative bodies, and the law on
the party membership of civil servants. 139  When the three bills were
endorsed by the DPR on January 28, 1999, President Habibie indicated that
they would undergo a one-month period of public dissemination and
comment before Habibie signed them into law. This comment period,
however, was revoked without explanation, severely limiting the opportunity
for public discussion and input.' On February 1, 1999, President Habibie
signed the legislation into law. Thus, in a mere six months, Indonesia's
entire political system was completely restructured and reinvented.
The international reaction to the passage of the political laws was
overwhelmingly positive. The international community viewed them as a
114 Id. at 217.
135 Indonesia-Second Supplementary Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies (June 24,
1998), Int'l Monetary Fund, http://www.imf.orgextemalnp/loi/O62498.htm.
136 Id.
137 The Indonesian Institute of Science (LIPI), the National Legal Reform Consortium (KRHN-LBH),
the Islamic Students Association (IIMI) and the Department of Justice presented proposals. REFORM IN
INDONESIA, supra note 26, at vol. 1, 113.
131 Vedi R Hadiz, Contesting Political Change After Soeharto, in REFORMASI: CRISIS AND CHANGE IN
INDONESIA, supra note 38, at 108, 122.
139 VAN DIJK, supra note 7, at 317.
40 Habibie Enacts Three New Political Laws, JAKARTA POST, Feb. 5, 1999, 1999 WL 563218.
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mechanism to end the deep social unrest that was interfering with economic
reform. In February 1999, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, Lawrence
Summers, met with President Habibie and "praised the government for its
achievements in political reforms and said there was a great opportunity to
further entrench democracy and restore the potential for rapid economic
growth.'
141
Despite their warm reception, as this comment argues below, the
political laws were not well tailored to the disparate needs of Indonesians.
14 2
Many of the shortcomings of Indonesia's commercial courts are analogous
to the problems faced by the new political laws. The commercial courts
were created under duress, although they are distinguishable because the
creation of the courts was an explicit IMF loan conditionality. Since their
inception, the commercial courts have been widely noted as totally
ineffective at enforcing creditor rights-judges were poorly trained and the
courts lacked the institutional strength to face up to pressure from
Indonesia's elite. 43 As Daniel Lev points out,
It did not help that the commercial courts were erected under
pressure from the World Bank and IMF, whose concerns for
speed have more to do with the short term problem of debt
repayment and economic restructuring than Indonesia's more
imperative longer term interest in creating an effective legal
system. Haste, in this case, may indeed have made waste.144
The political laws, too, suffer from the World Bank and IMF's short horizon.
While international pressure did work to convince the Indonesian
government that political reform was imminently necessary, the fast-track
141 Results of June Elections Key to Recovery: Summers, JAKARTA POST, Feb. 23, 1999, 1999 WL
5632836. Despite this progress, the international community recognized that there was still need for
additional progress to achieve political stability. An editorial in The Straits Times of Singapore contended
that Indonesia
must do all it can to re-establish political stability first, in order for the economy to recover.
This is going to be an uphill struggle, both on the political and economic fronts. Politically, the
Habibie government lacks popular support and finds it hard to rein in the growing lawlessness
that has done much to damage the country's prospects.
More Help for Jakarta, STRAITS TIMEs, Feb. 11, 1999, 1999 WL 8245933.
142 See infra Part V. and VI.
141 William A.W. Neilson, The Rush to Law: The IMF Legal Conditionalities Meet Indonesia's Legal
Culture Realities, in INDONESIA AFTER SOEHARTO: REFORMASI AND REACTION, supra note 127, at 103.
'44 Daniel Lev, Comments on the Course of Law Reform in Modern Indonesia, in INDONESIA AFrER
SOEHARTO: REFORMASI AND REACTION INTERNATIONAL COLLOQUIUM PROCEEDINGS MARCH 19, 1999 at
88, 102 (Drew Duncan & Timothy C. Lindsey eds., 1999).
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nature of the reform hindered political debate and discussion of the laws. 145
Thus, it is not surprising that Indonesia as a nation failed to solve, or even
address, problems of regional conflict and state terror. 146  Moreover,
international pressure to quickly pass a political reform package allowed the
Indonesian elite to keep the process of drafting behind closed doors, to the
detriment of reformasi.147
B. The Involvement of Indonesian Elite 's in the Political Reform Process
From the beginning, those involved in the drafting of the political
laws sought to limit political participation. As one commentator notes,
Indonesia's elite feared "a politically mobilised rakyat [people] more than
anything else." 148 While Habibie's official platform was "commitment to a
multiparty system, there was always a lot of unease in government and
military circles about elections that were open for contestation by an
unlimited number of political parties." 149 Indonesia's elite wanted to ensure
that very few political parties met the requirements to participate in the
general election, in order to ensure that fewer, more nationalized, parties
would exist to question their use of power. There is a longstanding debate
among academics over why the rule of law (or negara hukum) has failed to
establish itself in Indonesia. One emerging theory is that the elite has
prevented the implementation of legal reforms "precisely because [legal
reform] would conflict with elite rentseeking activity."'150  Preventing the
rule of law from taking hold became exponentially more important once the
Suharto regime collapsed, because there was no longer a consenting
government protecting the existing power structure. Within this post-
Suharto power vacuum, Indonesia's ruling economic and military elite used
its influence during the legislative drafting process to limit political
participation.
Initial drafts of the political laws required that political parties operate
offices in all fourteen of Indonesia's provinces and demonstrate party
145 At the time the political laws were passed, there was no formal legal mechanism for gathering
public comments; thus, even without international pressure, there was no procedural barrier to the laws'
quick passage. Interview with Professor Veronica Taylor, supra note 83. The DPR is currently in the
process of creating formal processes for public review and comment. Id.
:4 See supra Part III.
147 See infra Part IV.B.
148 David Bourchier, Conservative Political Ideology in Indonesia: A Fourth Wave?, in INDONESIA
TODAY: CHALLENGES OF HISTORY, supra note 11, at 120.
:49 Hadiz, supra note 138, at 114.
s0 David K. Linnan, Indonesian Law Reform, or Once More Unto the Breach: A Brief Institutional
History, in INDONESIA AFrER SOEHARTO: REFORMASI AND REACTION, supra note 127, at 108.
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support by collecting the signatures of one million people.151 Both
requirements would have imposed great financial and logistical burdens on
new and burgeoning parties. These proposals seem implausible when one
remembers that the political party laws were scheduled to come into effect in
February 1999, and parties would need to meet all requirements well before
the June 1999 election.' 52 This meant that new political parties would have
had approximately four months to gather one million signatures and
establish offices in fourteen Indonesian provinces-a truly Herculean task.
Based on these drafts, which were created by a hand-picked group
from Suharto's old cohort,153 student activists widely rejected the laws as a
product of the old power structure.' 54  The drafts of the political laws,
instead of fulfilling the reformasi dreams of participatory democracy,
became a battle cry for further demonstrations. An editorial in the Jakarta
Post blasted the draft laws as written by self-interested, corrupt elite:
We have to constantly remind ourselves that most of those in
the government ... are essentially the same people who barely
six months ago gave their unquestionable support not only to
Soeharto, but also to the corrupt political system .... [G]iven
their recent history, their intentions must be questioned. They
cannot and must not be trusted. They are giving as little as
possible, responding only to demands .... [T]he nation should
not simply sit and watch. We can exert pressure, even greater
pressure than we have been exerting, through demonstrations
and discourses to let them know of our position ....
Democracy, and therefore the future of our nation, is far too
precious to be left in the hands of the likes of Habibie and his
inner circle.
55
Reformasi had little confidence that the elite would draft liberal political
laws. As the editorial notes, the same elite that was involved in drafting the
political laws was enmeshed in the corrupt schemes of the Suharto regime
151 40 New Parties Protest Proposed Political Laws, JAKARTA POST, Oct. 30, 1998, 1998 WL
13124329.
152 Government Confirms Political Reform Agenda, JAKARTA POST, June 23, 1998, 1998 WL
13120022.
153 Hadiz, supra note 138, at 108, 122. A seven-member team from the Department of the Interior
drafted the political laws and submitted them to the DPR and MPR. Id.
15 It was not until a student meeting was held in February 1999 that student leaders agreed to support
the laws in their final form and participate in the June 1999 general elections. Students Support Poll as
Lesser Evil, JAKARTA POST, Feb. 23, 1999, 1999 WL 5632850.
155 Playing with Politics, JAKARTA POST, Sept. 21, 1998, LEXIS.
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"barely six months ago."'156 During the New Order, a complex web of
corruption surrounded former President Suharto and his clan. 157  The
Suharto clan and its allies managed to "amas[s] vast personal wealth through
countless business involvements and relying on the brutal armed forces and
corrupt courts to protect the entire framework of exploitation."' 58 Many of
the profits were made through free handouts, or "concessions," given to
domestic and international companies interested in mining Indonesia's vast
natural resources, often at the expense of indigenous population in peripheral
provinces.1
59
The military was also involved in corrupt schemes, not to mention
human rights violations. During the New Order, each district command of
the military "operated a variety of (loosely 'legal') businesses that generated
thousands of dollars a month as well as offering free 'services"' and
garnished "proceeds from bribes and lucrative illegal businesses.' 60 In
August 1998, General Wiranto, the chief of the Indonesian military,
admitted that Indonesian troops were involved in kidnapping political
activists and shooting demonstrators during the May 1998 riots in Jakarta.
161
At the same time, mass graves were uncovered in Aceh, and some estimates
suggest that as many as 39,000 people had been killed by the military.' 62 At
the time of drafting, the elite had much to hide.
After limited debate in the DPR, the final version of the political party
laws was somewhat more generous-the province requirement was reduced
to eight163 and the signature requirement was scrapped altogether. However,
a searching review of the laws and their implemehitation reveals that the
Indonesian elite was successful in limiting political participation.
The political laws codify the principle of Pancasila democracy, 164
which was developed to bind a diverse nation together with a common
ideology. 165 While this common ideology might be beneficial to elite whose
primary interest is in stability, Pancasila limits political thought and debate.
One of the principles of Pancasila-a commitment to national
156 id.
157 SIMONS, supra note 13, at 34-35.
18 Id. at 34.
'I Id. at 43.
160 Adrian Vickers, The New Order: Keeping Up Appearances, in INDONESIA TODAY: CHALLENGES
OF HISTORY, supra note 11, at 76.
161 SIMONS, supra note 13, at 226.
162 Id.
163 Law Concerning General Elections No. 3, art. 39, § 1 (Rep. of Indon., Dept. of Info., trans., 1999).
164 id.
16' Id. art. 9. a.
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unity 166-automatically makes any attempt to form a peaceful pro-
independence, and perhaps even pro-autonomy party, illegal. Thus, the
Pancasila provision has serious ramifications for Acehnese and Papuan
activists calling for an act of self-determination. The requirement that
parties adhere to the principles of Pancasila reinforces the central
government's demand for stability and homogeneity throughout Indonesia;
however it overlooks the fact that the Indonesian commitment to unity from
diversity has historically come at a high price-state-sponsored violence.
The ideology of Pancasila is also reflected in the laws' proclivity to
concentrate power at the national level. The three national Suharto-era
parties-Golkar, PPP and PDI-were grandfathered into the system, making
the transition easier for parties dominated by the national elite.' 67  The
number of parties who are currently eligible to compete in general elections
will be further limited in the next elections. The requirement that parties
gain at least 2% of the seats in the DPR or 3% of the seats in the DPRD in
order to participate in the next election will effectively cull out parties that
lack broad national support. 168 If a party fails to meet the seat percentage
requirements in 1999, it would be forced to join another political party in
order to compete again.' 69 Over time, this combination requirement will
likely create a consolidation of party power at the national level, and further
entrench the national elite. In the June 1999 general election, approximately
one-third of registered political parties was able to meet the requirements of
the political laws 170 and "the political parties that survived the contested
elections of 1999 are still very largely those of the Suharto era."'171 While
this power consolidation may make Indonesia's political system more stable,
it also will stifle the development of regional and grassroots movements.
The requirement that parties be national in scope in order to
participate in general elections also creates serious rifts at the provincial
level. In the outlying provinces of Aceh and Papua, political sentiments are
often closely linked to views on independence from the central government;
pro-independence views, however, fail to gather national appeal. Thus,
through the political laws, the political views of the periphery are effectively
'6 Id. art. 9, b-c.
167 Law Concerning Political Parties No. 2, art. 20 (Rep. of Indon., Dept. of Info., trans., 1999).
168 Law Concerning General Elections No. 3, art. 39, § 3 (Rep. of Indon., Dept. of Info., trans., 1999).
169 Id. art. 39, § 4. Of course, this law does not prevent political parties from existing, it only hinders
their participation in General Elections. Id. Parties may also choose to disband and reform under another
name. Id.
170 48 Parties Eligible to Contest Election, JAKARTA POST, Mar. 5, 1999, 1998 WL 13120022. Forty-
eight parties were declared qualified to contest the June 7, 1999 general elections out of 141 who registered
at the Ministry of Justice. Id
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silenced by the political whims of a national majority. By precluding the
participation of provincial parties in general elections, the elite removed key
provincial issues of independence and human rights violations from the
national political agenda.
V. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE EXISTING POLITICAL LAWS
Ultimately, the existing political laws and constitution fail to canonize
a full right of association for Indonesians in the provinces of Aceh and
Papua. The political laws provide for the suppression and disbandment of
political associations that advocate for provincial autonomy or
independence, thus endangering national unity; moreover, the laws prevent
important provincial issues from reaching the national spotlight. While legal
reform, without an attendant shift in the cultural attitudes of the government
and people, will never work a complete solution, the existing laws are
clearly flawed and should be revised.
A. Proposed Amendments to the Political Laws
Indonesia's MPR (People's Consultative Assembly) is expected to
pass Indonesia's third constitutional amendment, which would create a
system of direct (rather than parliamentary) presidential elections. 172 In the
meantime, there is much discussion about attempting to amend the existing
political laws to better fit the new constitutional framework. The
government is experimenting with ways to tighten requirements for new
political parties to participate in the 2004 general election. 173 One draft
amendment would require all new parties to have Rp 150 million
(approximately $14,000 US) in bank deposits in each of its provinces.
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Another draft amendment would require that political parties establish
branches in two-thirds of the country's provinces and in two-thirds of the
regencies/municipalities in the respective provinces where they have
branches. 75 Both of these proposed amendments would further limit
Indonesians' rights to association and further marginalize opposition parties.
172 Late Amendment Harms Elections, JAKARTA POST, Nov. 13, 2001, LEXIS; Gov't Tightens Up
Election Procedures, JAKARTA POST, Nov. 24, 2001, LEXIS.
173 Gov't Tightens Up Election Procedures, supra note 172.
174 id.
175 id.
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B. The Need for Further Reform
By refining the language of the political laws and closing gaps that
allow for state suppression of the right of political association, Indonesia
might better codify the right of association. In addition, Indonesia might
provide a mechanism for peaceful political association in Aceh and Papua.
Under Law 2/1999 Concerning Political Parties and Law 3/1999
Concerning General Elections, all political parties are bound by the
requirement that they comply with the five principals of Pancasila.1
76
Pancasila was created by Indonesia's first president, President Sukarno,
Suharto's predecessor, as the national ideology that would hold the disparate
provinces of Indonesia together. Pancasila is a self-contained ideology that
focuses on national unity, centralized power, and common belief. While
Pancasila may be "general enough to give room to various value
orientation[,]" it is less certain that Pancasila "is general enough to include
various value orientations other than those of the Javanese [who populate the
province of Java at Indonesia's center]. 177 Thus, the ideological glue that
has purportedly bound Indonesian society together for decades may act to
create a Javanese hegemony rather than foster political pluralism. Because
Pancasila designates acceptable and unacceptable political ideologies, the
freedom to create a Pancasila-compliant political party does not equal a
right to political association. The requirement that all parties comply with
the principles of Pancasila should be removed from Laws No. 2/1999 and
3/1999.
The concept of Pancasila is reflected through the political laws' focus
on national unity and centralized power. While the language of the Law
Concerning Political Parties, Law 2/1999, indicates that any party may
legally exist that does not "endanger the national unity or integrity,1 7 8 in
practice, groups that peacefully advocate a greater degree of provincial
autonomy or a referendum on independence have been suppressed through
state-sponsored violence. 79 Thus, the state has chosen to interpret the term
"endanger" to encompass the discussion of a political idea. The political
party laws should be amended to distinguish between parties that peacefully
advocate greater autonomy or independence and those that make a call to
arms or incite violence. The blanket-ban against parties that "endanger the
176 See INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, supra note 17.
177 DARMAPJTERA, supra note 17, at 202.178 Law Concerning Political Parties No. 2, art. 3, art. 9 (b)-(c) (Rep. of Indon., Dept. of Info., trans.,
1999).
179 See supra Part III.
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national unity or integrity ' 8 must be amended to clarify that "endanger"
means endanger through violence, not political expression. In addition, the
General Election Law's requirement that the parties have offices in at least
eight of the provinces18' keeps peaceful pro-independence activists from
placing their issues on the national political agenda. The eight-province
requirement alienates provincial activists and draws power away from
grassroots movements; thus, it should be removed.
Finally, beyond the shortcomings of the political laws, the ambiguous
language of Indonesia's 1945 Constitution leaves the right of political
association vulnerable to changing political winds. Article 28 of the
Constitution should be amended to guarantee an independent Constitutional
right of political association. Through the late 1990s "state institutions
[were] manipulated by a succession of authoritarian regimes, using the
ambiguity of the 1945 Constitution to legalise their grip on power."' 8 2 The
plain language of Article 28 points to its major inadequacy: the article
relies on separate laws to protect the freedom of association. The current
Article 28 depends completely on the DPR to pass laws that establish a
liberal right of association. While laws that attempt to codify a right of
association may exist today, they have not in the past, and may not in the
future.
VI. THE CONSEQUENCES OF SHORTCOMINGS IN THE 1999 POLITICAL LAWS
Since the inception of the political laws, Indonesia's executive has
wavered between pledging support to the freedom of association and
engaging the military to eliminate political dissent. Under Indonesia's 1945
Constitution, the executive "must execute the State policy."'' 1 State policy
surely includes the implementation of the 1999 political laws; however, the
executive has repeatedly employed the military to suppress political
's Law Concerning Political Parties No. 2, art. 3, and art. 9 (b)-(c) (Rep. of Indon., Dept. of Info.,
trans., 1999).
ts' Law Concerning General Election No. 3, ch. VII, art. 39, § 1(b) (Rep. of Indon., Dept. of Info.,
trans., 1999) (Requirements of Participation in General Elections).
182 id
183 The gap in the existing political framework was pointed out early on during the Reform period by
activists such as Joseph Saunders of the New York-based Human Rights Watch, who warned that "[flailure
to institutionalize political openness this time around in a climate of relative freedom will lead to the old
trap of gags on freedom of expression." Activist Urges RI Not to Let Freedoms Fade, JAKARTA POST, Sept.
10, 1998, LEXIS.
184 INDON. CONST. (1945) art. 3, § 3, translated in MASS MEDIA LAWS AND REGULATIONS IN
INDONESIA 183, 184 (Abdul Razak ed. & trans., 2000), available at http://inic.utexas.edu/asnic/
countries/indonesia/Constlndonesia.html.
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association in the outlying provinces of Aceh and Papua."' This military
suppression is in some sense justified by the executive's broad reading of the
requirement that political parties refrain from "endanger[ing] the national
unity and integrity" of Indonesia. 186  Presidents Habibie, Wahid, and
Megawati have been deeply concerned with the stability and unity of
Indonesia. Thus, they have often viewed even the peaceful utterance of pro-
independence views as a threat to state unity.
18 7
Yet the Indonesian government's refusal to distinguish between the
incitement of resurrection and violence against the state and the peaceful
expression of pro-independence views facilitates violence. Drawing a line
between peaceful advocacy of independence and incitement to violence is
not a novel concept. For instance, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights of December 16, 1966 proclaims that "[a]ll peoples have the
right of self-determination[,]" acknowledges that all persons have "the
right[s] of peaceful assembly" and "association with others," but still states
that "[a]ny advocacy of national ... hatred that constitutes incitement to...
hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law."'
l 88
Unfortunately, there is no indication that Indonesia's pattern of
resorting to the military to suppress peaceful advocacy of provincial
independence, or a referendum for independence, will end in the near future.
While addressing the Indonesian military in December 2001, President
Megawati told troops that violence was necessary to "hold the country
together" and that if the soldiers "keep within the law," they "should do
[their] duty without worrying about being involved in human rights
abuses."' 189 Of course, any interpretation of Megawati's assertion hinges on
what exactly "the law" permits and what exactly endangerment of national
unity means. Megawati's speech to TNI was interpreted by human rights
groups as giving the military permission to continue human rights abuses in
Aceh and Papua.19
0
For many, the political laws have been a disappointment. As one
Indonesian scholar comments,
1s5 See supra Part I.
'8 Law Concerning Political Parties No. 2, art. 3 (Rep. of Indon., Dept. of Info., trans., 1999).
': See supra Part M.
18 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, arts. 1, 20, 21, 22, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, available at Univ. of Minn. Human Rights Library, http://wwwl.umn.edu/
humanrts/instree/b3ccpr.htm.
189 Press Release, Tapol: The Indonesia Human Rights Campaign, Megawati's Carte Blanche to
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In the last days of May 1998, as the Soeharto era drew to a
close, it appeared that we in Indonesia might finally have
escaped our historical pattern of violence and state suppression
.... When reform was first embarked upon there were hopes
that democracy, peace and justice could become a reality for
Indonesians. However, the old story has been repeating itself,
and violence is still the order of the day.
1 91
Ultimately, the government has refused to distinguish between peaceful and
violent pro-independence groups in Aceh and Papua. Because violence is
employed equally against both groups, there is little incentive for indigenous
persons to engage in peaceful political dialogue. Thus, Indonesians in both
provinces have failed to reap the benefits of the political system and rights of
association created by the political laws. The political laws were written in a
manner that alienates persons who desire to peacefully discuss the
possibility of independence. While on their face the political laws seem to
offer an alternative scheme of conflict resolution through political
association and debate, in practice this scheme has proven unworkable for
Aceh and Papua.
The political laws do not provide Acehnese and Papuans with the
right to peacefully express their pro-independence views; thus, there is little
alternative to the armed separatism of GAM or OPM. Under the New Order
regime, Indonesian unity was enforced through state violence via an all-
powerful military. To further the process of democratization, Indonesia
should explore ways to create unity through a strong civil society rather than
state-sponsored violence. In the meantime, the provinces remain polarized,
with GAM and OPM on one side and the military on the other, with little
room for middle ground. Thus, the political laws promise little more than an
uneasy stalemate, institutionalizing an on-going cycle of state-sponsored
violence and suppression. Unless alternative avenues of expression are
created, this cycle of violence may escalate into a reliving of the East Timor
debacle.
VII. CONCLUSION
The 1999 political laws represented a historical shift in Indonesia's
political system. While the political laws' facilitated the development of
191 Nursyahbani Katyasungkana, Exchanging Power or Changing Power? The Problem of Creating
Democratic Institutions, in INDONESIA IN TRANSITION: SOCIAL ASPECTS OF REFoRMASI AND CRISIS, supra
note 1, at 15.
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new political parties and free and fair general elections, they failed to secure
a right of political association for all Indonesians. The political laws were
drafted hastily to satisfy international loan organizations. This drafting
process was effectively co-opted by Indonesian elite. Beyond problems in
drafting and implementation, the political laws fail to canonize a true right of
association. Instead, the current political laws alienate provincial activists
and prevent provincial issues from reaching the national political agenda.
These shortcomings in the political laws are compounded by the
executive's ready resort to military force to suppress both peaceful and
armed pro-independence activists. The bloodshed in Aceh and Papua has
gathered international attention and disdain. Yet, because the executive
refuses to distinguish between civil society-based movements and armed
insurgent groups when employing military force, there is no window for
peaceful political dissent with central government policies. By allowing an
opportunity for the peaceful debate of provincial independence and
autonomy issues, Indonesia might forge a new national solidarity that is
rooted in discussion and compromise rather than the coercive combination
of Pancasila "democracy" and state-sponsored violence. Moreover,
Indonesia might defuse the risk of a second East Timor by presenting an
alternative to the cycle of violence and suppression.
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